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A B S T R A C T

Over the past several years, there has been considerable debate surrounding ethical decision making in situations
resulting in inevitable casualties. Given enough time and all other things being equal, studies show that drivers will
typically decide to strike the fewest number of pedestrians in scenarios where there is a choice between striking several
versus one or no pedestrians. However, it is unclear whether drivers behave similarly under situations of time pressure.
In our experiment in a driving simulator, 32 drivers were given up to 2 s to decide which group of pedestrians to avoid
among groups of larger (5) or smaller (≤1) number of pedestrians. Our ﬁndings suggest that while people frequently
choose utilitarian decisions in the typical, abstract manifestations of the Trolley Problems, drivers can fail to make utilitarian decisions in simulated driving environments under a restricted period of time representative of the time they
would have to make the same decision in the real world (2 s). Analysis of eye movement data shows that drivers
are less likely to glance at left and right sides of crosswalks under situations of time duress. Our results raise critical
engineering and ethical questions. From a cognitive engineering standpoint, we need to know how long at minimum
a driver needs to make simple, moral decisions in different scenarios. From an ethical standpoint, we may need to evaluate whether automated vehicle algorithms can aid decision making on our behalf when there is not enough time for a
driver to make a moral decision.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction
Ethical decision-making problems have been widely studied in different
domains such as healthcare, economics and driving (Awad et al., 2018;
Frison et al., 2016; Kälvemark et al., 2004; Dickinson and Masclet, 2019).
In driving, humans are destined to face infrequent yet safety-critical situations where casualties are inevitable (Goodall, 2014). These scenarios
could require us to make ethical decisions in a limited amount of time.
For example, with insufﬁcient time to brake, drivers may have to choose
to save ﬁve pedestrians crossing the road by veering to the side and instead
striking only one pedestrian, a response that might be infeasible for the
driver as the available time to action (swerve left or right) reduces. The primary question then surrounds the minimum time required by a driver to
make a moral decision in a safety-critical scenario.
The Trolley Problem is a popular paradigm for studying moral decisionmaking processes (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). In the switch Trolley Problem, the most common manifestation of the Trolley Problem, participants
are asked to decide whether to ﬂip a switch to change the path of a trolley

that is heading towards ﬁve people to a separate track where one person is
standing. Typically, when faced with this moral dilemma, the majority of people behave in a utilitarian manner by choosing to sacriﬁce one individual to
save a group of people. Survey studies consistently show that humans prefer
making utilitarian decisions in Trolley Problem scenarios (Bleske-Rechek
et al., 2010). Recently, the Trolley Problem was studied in a dynamic,
virtual-reality environment (Navarrete et al., 2012). Navarrete et al. (2012) reported that 89% of participants across conditions chose the utilitarian outcome
which was to pull the switch and kill one individual rather than do nothing
and kill ﬁve individuals. Several studies demonstrate that participants' subjective and psychological responses in virtual reality environments closely map
their experience and behaviors in real world settings (Slater et al., 2006).
While utilitarianism is a popular model for how humans make decisions in
safety-critical scenarios (Bonnefon et al., 2016), until recently the empirical evidence that most humans are utilitarian was largely limited to the realm of
thought experiments. It remained unclear whether humans would consistently
choose the utilitarian decision if actually placed in a situation which required
them to take an action consistent with what they said they would do. Recent
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a surround speaker system was used in this study. The virtual environment
was projected to the forward screens with a resolution of 1920 × 1200
pixels and to the rear screen with a resolution of 1400 × 1050 pixels
with display refresh rate of 60 Hz. The simulator provided approximately
330° of a ﬁeld of view.

studies have provided a partial answer to this question. For example, in one
study, a virtual environment was used to assess whether participants would
choose to hit one pedestrian in the road over multiple pedestrians
(Faulhaber et al., 2019). Overwhelmingly, participants opted to make a utilitarian decision. A similar study, examining the effects of time pressure and naturalism of the method (VR or text based) used to assess moral decision
making, found that time pressure, but not necessarily realism, led to fewer decisions favoring saving the lives of young avatars and female avatars, contrary
to what was seen without time constraints (Sütfeld et al., 2019). Yet, another
study examining the interplay between intuitive and cognitive processes related to moral judgments found context-dependent gaze durations during decisions that involved sacriﬁce, leading participants to look for prolonged
durations at their victim, particularly if they had to choose between avatars
from differing genders (Skulmowski et al., 2014).
The second of the above three experiments suggests that as the time available to make a decision decreases, the individual diverges from what his or her
decision might be when there is more than enough time to make the decision
(Sütfeld et al., 2019). In this regard, it is worth noting that in the ﬁrst of the
above three experiments where the participants had 4 s to respond, making
a choice in that period of time is consistent with the choice they would
make without time constraints. Thus, one could conﬁdently hand decisionmaking responsibilities over to the driver in such situations. But, critically,
there will come a point when the driver will not have enough time to react,
let alone decide. From a cognitive engineering standpoint, we need to know
when the time is too short for a driver to make a decision consistent with
the decision he or she would make over a longer period of time.
With this in mind, a study was undertaken of the decisions that drivers
would make in a scenario which mimics the Trolley Problem under time
constraints which are more typical of those that might occur in real trafﬁc.
We chose 2 s as the time delimited period because it is typical of the length
of time drivers have to make a life or death decision going at freeway speeds
in heavy trafﬁc (Mordipour, 2014). Additionally, we chose to introduce eye
movement data to moral cognition research due to its ﬁner temporal resolution. Please note that gaze behavior in relation to sacriﬁcing decisions
in a trolley dilemma context has already been investigated in pen and
paper studies that show people typically avoid looking at pictures of the
sacriﬁced individuals (Kastner, 2010). While gaze behavior has been explored in one previous VR study (Skulmowski et al., 2014), the said study
focused on the temporal duration of the gaze while our study focuses on
the salient accuracy of the ﬁxation.
Speciﬁcally, the current driving simulator study examined whether
drivers make utilitarian decisions in situations of unavoidable harm as frequently as previously reported when in control of the vehicle and forced to
make a choice in an interval of just 2 s between striking ﬁve pedestrians versus one pedestrian (Scenario 1) or no pedestrians (Scenario 2).

2.2.2. Eye tracker
A Mobile Eye XG eye tracker (Applied Science Laboratory, Cambridge,
MA) was used to track and record participants' eye movements. The eye
tracker sampled the position of the eye at 30 Hz with a visual range of
50° horizontally and 40° vertically and simultaneously recorded an image
of the forward roadway at 30 Hz. The superimposed eye and forward roadway scene data were analyzed using the ASL Eye Map software.
2.3. Driving scenarios
Two separate scenarios were designed for the two experiments. The
0.85-mile long scenarios consisted of two lanes in each direction and involved ambient trafﬁc, buildings, some vegetation, and fog. A crosswalk
was placed 3520 ft from the beginning of each scenario. For both Scenario
1 and 2, there was a horizontal curve obscuring the upcoming crosswalk.
The intensity of fog was controlled so that the participants could see the pedestrians only 2 s before the crash. The speed limit was 45 mph as is typical
of curved roadsections in Massachusetts. Further, to provide experimental
control, all participants were asked to stay on the rightmost lane (of two
lanes). Participants closely adhered to the speed limit and requested lane
placement. Approximately 16 s prior to the cross-walk scenario, a series
of 5 black screen interruptions were presented for 2 s each with a 1second time interval between the black screens. The last black screen was
presented 2 s prior to the point where the drivers can ﬁrst view the pedestrians. The sensors were location-based so that the interruptions occurred at
the same location on the roadway for all participants across both scenarios.
The alternating black screens and forward views of the roadway mimicked
the information a driver would receive who was alternately glancing between an in-vehicle task and the forward roadway (Samuel and Fisher,
2015).
2.3.1. Scenario 1
In this scenario, there was one pedestrian entering the crosswalk from
the left side and ﬁve pedestrians from the right side, equally distant from
the driver (Fig. 1). The pedestrians were timed, and the scenario was programmed such that loss of either one or ﬁve pedestrians was unavoidable.
More speciﬁcally, the scenario is designed to be a 2-alternative forced-

2. Methods
2.1. Participants & design
Thirty-two paid participants (14 females; mean age = 29.2 years, SD =
12.6 years; mean years since licensure = 10.5 years, SD = 11.2 years) were
recruited from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and surrounding
areas. Sixteen participants were assigned to Scenario 1 and sixteen participants
were assigned to Scenario 2. Following a between-subject design, drivers were
randomly allocated to one of two scenarios. All participants reported good
health, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and held a valid US
driver's license. Participants were of varying education levels and included university students, local town workers, university staff and rural entrepreneurs.
2.2. Apparatus
2.2.1. Driving simulator
A high-ﬁdelity driving simulator (Real-Time Technologies Inc., Ann
Arbor, MI) consisting of a full-body 2013 model Ford Fusion Sedan, ﬁve forward facing projection screens and a single rear-end projection screen, and

Fig. 1. Driving scenario 1.
2

S. Samuel et al.

Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 5 (2020) 100147

participants were outﬁtted with an eye tracker which was then calibrated
using a 9-point scene calibration process. Following this, the participant
completed one of the two driving scenarios that they were randomly
assigned to. Their task was to drive each scenario at the speed limit (45
mph), following regular trafﬁc rules in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts while staying in the right lane. Following the experimental drives,
they were asked to complete a post-study questionnaire that included
basic demographic information, driving history, and subjective ethics questions (the complete list of subjective ethics questions are included in an appendix following references). There was a total of 16 items on the poststudy questionnaire that were subjective measures of ethics. These items
were assessed on a ﬁve-point Likert rating scale with a rating of 1 implying
strong disagreement and a rating of 5 noting strong agreement. No other instructions were given to participants.
2.5. Data analysis
Eye movements of the drivers were manually coded by two independent
raters to judge whether each driver glanced at the right or left extremities of
the crosswalk in each 2-second interval between the black screens. If the
two raters disagreed, they discussed such glances and resolved the disagreement. The variable was binary coded such that the presence of right or left
glances is coded as “1” or the absence as “0”. Previous experiments analyzing gaze duration towards sacriﬁced and non-sacriﬁced avatars used the entire left and right half of the screen as areas of interest (Skulmowski et al.,
2014). For ethics questionnaire items, each driver gave their rating on the
5-point Likert scale (1: Strongly Disagree – 5: Strongly Agree).

Fig. 2. Driving Scenario 2.

choice task. By a combination of design (scripting) and mechanics (brake
coefﬁcient), we have effectively constructed a scenario where drivers
need to make one of two decisions that both involve some form of swerving
(either left or right). Braking was not an effective option because the posted
speed limit was high enough that any braking action would result in a collision given the small braking distance and resultantly small (in the order of
milliseconds) time to collision window.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the participant is driving in the right lane, on a fourlane road. After being obscured by fog, a group of ﬁve pedestrians appeared
in front of the car in a crosswalk two seconds before the driver would strike
the group unless an evasive action was taken. One pedestrian was approaching from the left. Fig. 3 presents perspective views of both scenarios.

3. Results & discussion
To analyze the data, we conducted one-sample t-tests comparing the obtained data against the reported proportion in Navarrete et al. (2012). In
Scenario 1, only 43% of the participants chose the utilitarian outcome
[with a 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) of 20–69]. This proportion is signiﬁcantly less than the 89%, reported by Navarrete et al. (2012) in which the
drivers had 4 s to make a decision (p < .001). The participants glanced towards the left and right extremities of the crosswalk less frequently when
comparing the two-second safety-critical interval to the control intervals
prior to the critical interval. Eye movement data were entered to a series
of one-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with Interval as a within-subject factor, separately for glances to the left and the
right extremities.
Figs. 4 and 5 show mean number of proportions glancing to the right
and left extremities in Scenario 1 and 2 respectively, with the safetycritical interval highlighted. In Scenario 1, more drivers glanced to the
right during the 1st interval then progressively less until the end of the scenario [F(4, 60) = 3.46, p = .01] but similar number of drivers glanced to
the left extremity during the simulated drive [F(4, 60) = 1.13, p = .34],

2.3.2. Scenario 2
In the second scenario (see Fig. 2), the participant is driving in the right
lane, on a four-lane road. After being obscured by fog, a group of ﬁve pedestrians appeared in front of the car in a crosswalk. There were no pedestrians
to the left. All other elements were the same as Scenario 1.
2.4. Procedure
Participants provided explicit written consent to participate in this
study. The experimenter provided a set of general instructions for driving
in virtual environments and a couple of practice drives to familiarize the
participants with the driving simulator. After the practice drives, the

Fig. 3. Left Panel: Scenario design with one pedestrian on the left and 5 pedestrians on the right; Right Panel: Scenario design with no pedestrian on the left and 5 pedestrians
on the right.
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1 vs. 5 Scenario

who did not opt for the utilitarian outcome (M = 4.33), independent 2group W = 30, p = 1.
Our ﬁndings suggest that while people frequently choose utilitarian decisions in the typical, abstract manifestations of the Trolley Problems,
drivers can fail to make utilitarian decisions in simulated driving environments representative of the restricted period of time they would have to
make the same decision in the real world (two seconds). This ﬁnding by itself may not seem surprising, especially given a typical perception-response
time of 1.5 s in driving scenarios (Muttart, 2018). However, this general
perception-response time depends on a number of different factors. For
our particular scenario, studies indicate that 85% of drivers can respond
faster than 1.4 s when a previously obstructed hazard is ﬁrst seen in the
road and 95% can respond faster than 1.7 s. (Muttart, 2018). In summary,
from an engineering perspective, two seconds seems like it is enough
given the information on perception-response times in the literature
(e.g., Muttart, 2018). But, we have seen with our experiment that 2 s is simply too little time to make a decision consistent with the choice drivers
would make given a longer time frame.
We simply do not know how much time is enough to make ethical decisions
while driving, but clearly need to know. This time will depend on a number of
factors, some still to be discovered. From an ethical standpoint, we are now in a
position to know that algorithms used in automated driving systems could
make decisions for us that we cannot make when time is constrained and
that we would prefer given a longer time to make the decisions. This question
has not been raised to date with respect to more complex scenarios like those
we have discussed and we think it deserves more attention.
Interestingly, the eye movement data show that the drivers are less
likely to glance at the left and right sides of the road when under stress
(in the safety-critical interval) than they are when not under stress. To
put this slightly differently, the stress presumably induced when the driver
discovers that he or she is about to strike ﬁve pedestrians causes the driver
to become functionally ﬁxated on the outcome, instead of looking for more
alternatives (Orasanu, 1997). We now understand that the mental process
of appraising a threat and the available countermeasures take place in the
pre-frontal cortex (PFC). If the threat can be handled by means of wellpracticed habits, a response is triggered at lower brain levels (the amygdala
and the basal ganglia). When habitual responses are not applicable to the
threat, as is presumably the case in our scenario, reasoning and recall of
non-habitual behaviors are required. Unfortunately, and for reasons not
fully understood, the stress response (which quickly triggers a host of
changes in brain functions) inhibits activity in the PFC (Arnsten, 2009).
These changes in brain function probably have survival value for “ﬁght or
ﬂight” responses but may be maladaptive in the face of many modern
threats such as the one we have in this scenario.
The results of the post-study questionnaire were not found to be statistically signiﬁcant between the utilitarian and non-utilitarian drivers across
any of the 16 items (see Appendix). The mean score for utilitarian drivers
on item 6 on the questionnaire (‘It is acceptable to risk harming others in
order to save one's own life’) is 1.73 compared to 1.94 for the nonutilitarian drivers. On a subsequent item (‘It is right to harm one person
on the road to save many people’), utilitarian drivers posted lower mean
score of 2.87 compared to 3.35 for the non-utilitarian. While the results
were not signiﬁcant between utilitarian and non-utilitarian drivers in
terms of subjective ratings, drivers tended to behave differently when put
in situations of time-constrained ethical decision making. Future studies
should perhaps focus more on the underlying mechanisms that control
drivers behavior instead of solely relying on what they say.
Ultimately, human choices to make utilitarian decisions may rest on
several cross-cultural, socio-economic and physiological factors (Costa
et al., 2014; Terpstra et al., 1993; Vitell et al., 1993). The current study utilizes eye movements to demonstrate how a sample of college town drivers
would respond to safety-critical situations requiring moral judgments
under time pressure of 2 s. Inevitably, there remains much to be learned
about the factors that need to be considered. However, from an implication
perspective, there are a few key takeaways for major stakeholders including
auto manufacturers, policy ofﬁcials and the general public. Policy ofﬁcials
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Fig. 4. Proportion of drivers glancing to the right (black) or the left (gray) extremity
as a function of time until crash in seconds. [Note: negative time indicates the
duration before a potential collision].

showing no measurable difference between the intervals where the pedestrians were invisible and the last interval where they were visible in both
scenarios. Finally, we analyzed the participants' subjective ratings to a questionnaire item regarding ethics in driving: “Vehicles should try to protect as
many pedestrians as possible in a crash or collision scenario.” A ShapiroWilk normality test was conducted for each of the two groups, and both
tests indicated signiﬁcant violations of the normality assumption. Therefore, we used a non-parametric alternative of independent-samples t-test,
the independent 2-group Mann–Whitney U test. Participants who steered
left and hit only one pedestrian (M = 4.43) did not signiﬁcantly differ in
their rating than those who continued straight and hit ﬁve pedestrians (M
= 4.0), independent 2-group W = 42, p = .25.
In Scenario 2, despite the option to maneuver past the ﬁve pedestrians
altogether, only 62.5% of the drivers successfully evaded the group of
ﬁve pedestrians (with a 95% CI of 35 to 83). This proportion was again signiﬁcantly less than that of Navarrete et al. (2012) (p = .002). Their eye
movements to the left and right sides during the 2 s immediately prior to
the crash were no different from those during the control intervals. In Scenario 2, the number of drivers glancing to the left and right extremities did
not vary across the different time intervals [both p > .27]. Similarly to Scenario 1, drivers who opted for the utilitarian outcome (M = 4.38) did not
signiﬁcantly differ in their rating regarding ethics in driving than those
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4. Conclusions

may consider the impacts of time duress on ethical decision making. Now
we have data that tells us that our decisions given ample time do not necessarily align with our decisions under limited time. With an understanding of
the delimited time limit of 2 s, trafﬁc engineers could consider integrating
design elements in the trafﬁc infrastructure that minimize the occurrence
of situations requiring a sudden, ethical outcome. Auto manufacturers
may consider these ﬁndings in the development of AV moral algorithms
to closely align with expectations. The drivers themselves may utilize
these ﬁndings to better calibrate themselves regarding the limits on effective decision making under situations where outcomes need to be determined in under 2 s. A better understanding of temporal limits provides us
with more effective pathways towards realizing desirable decision
outcomes.

n summary, the essence of the abstract Trolley Problem centers on human
agency. Is an individual willing to let nature take its course and not intervene
or, instead, to intervene and essentially save a number of lives? The answer
from surveys is that most individuals were willing to intervene, to make
what was essentially a utilitarian choice. But there was still the question of
whether people would actually perform this way when given actual agency.
Simulators allow researchers to study this. And indeed, when given enough
time, individuals did make the utilitarian choice (Navarrete et al., 2012). Nevertheless, individuals are not always given enough time. In fact, our research
suggests that drivers are routinely placed in time constrained situations
where the decisions they make under such constraints are not consistent
with the decisions they would make given more time. As a consequence,
our research directly raises the question of whether algorithms in automated
driving systems that more accurately reﬂect our choices should perhaps be
allowed to make those choices for us as drivers, especially when we do not
have the time we need to make the choices we presumably would prefer.
Note that this ﬂies directly in the face of a common sentiment. Most drivers
do not want ethical decisions being made for them. What they do not
know, in our opinion, is that they are placing themselves in situations
where the decisions they are making are contrary to the decisions that they
would have made given more time.

3.1. Limitations
There are several limitations with our approach. First, the study consists
of only two scenarios. Generalizability across all situations will be limited.
However, we chose to include what we thought was the most representative scenario to a philosophical thought experiment. Second, no measures
of hazard mitigation involving steering or brake responses were collected
in the current project and ultimately the ability to mitigate a potential
threat is a critical component of what enables crash avoidance. Future research should incorporate drivers' steering and braking responses as behavioral measures that may provide further insights into drivers' intention in
the driving environment involving ethical dilemmas under time constraints. Third, the study is conducted on a driving simulator and incorporates a small sample that may not be fully representative of the general
population thereby placing some limits on generalizability to the open
road. The simulator did offer a safe environment to collect data in a controlled environment. Fourth, previous research indicates that several factors that were not controlled in this study, such as demographic traits
(including education, employment, and language) and socio-cultural and
environmental characteristics, are likely to affect ethical decision making
in drivers. Further research should explore the speciﬁc individual, demographic, cultural, or societal factors that impact ethical decision making
for drivers both in traditional vehicles and those equipped with more advanced assistance systems. Last, the inclusion of a condition where drivers
make decisions in a trolley scenario following a period of extended supervision or monitoring in a mid-level autonomous vehicle, would have allowed
for a robust comparison of drivers' decision making under duress across systems with different levels of autonomy. This can be a future study.
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Appendix A. Results of post-study questionnaire

Mean rating (1 = Strongly disagree,
5 = Strongly agree)

Items

Rules of road are the key in determining whether the action is right or wrong.
(Ex:- Not overtaking school bus, yielding to the drivers in roundabouts, etc.)
It's fair to take driving allowances too, while driving on freeway.
(Ex: Pulled over by police, observing speed limits, etc.)
You rely more on personal state of mind while making decisions on road.
(For Ex: Fear, Frustration, Enjoyment, Loneliness, etc.)
Applying on-road rules too rigidly forces you towards a possible collision.
I get disconnected on road while driving in trafﬁc with exceedingly congested public.
It is acceptable to risk harming others in order to save one's own life.
It is right to harm one person on road to save the lives of many people.
I feel that I can't trust the people and pedestrians on the road.
Following the vehicles in front of me when I am lost, but I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to completely trust them.
I prefer to do secondary tasks while driving in town.
Hand-held mobile phone conversation while driving doesn't have you preoccupied.
Vehicles should try to protect as many pedestrians as possible in a crash or collision scenario.
Long and forward roadway glances are not so important on a freeway drive.

Utilitarian
(N = 16)

Non-Utilitarian
(N = 16)

t-value
(df = 30)

p-value

4.60

4.59

0.05

0.96

3.87

3.41

1.25

0.22

2.40

2.29

0.27

0.79

2.60
3.07
1.73
2.87
3.27
3.27
2.07
2.00
4.13
2.13

2.76
2.59
1.94
3.35
3.29
2.65
2.24
2.12
4.47
1.76

0.40
1.33
0.72
1.34
0.07
1.67
0.48
0.31
1.30
1.06

0.69
0.19
0.48
0.19
0.95
0.10
0.64
0.76
0.20
0.30

(continued on next page)
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(continued)
Mean rating (1 = Strongly disagree,
5 = Strongly agree)

Items

Emotions of driver play an important role in on-road decision making.
(Ex: Driving Distraction, Road rage, etc.)
Whether you are calm, nervous, or hot-tempered, your emotions are affected by the
interactive behavior of people on road.
Use of good judgment, common sense, courtesy, and safe driving rules are insigniﬁcant
to ensure your safety and the safety of others.

Utilitarian
(N = 16)

Non-Utilitarian
(N = 16)

t-value
(df = 30)

p-value

4.33

4.00

1.17

0.25

3.80

3.59

0.51

0.61

1.53

1.71

0.44

0.67

Kastner, R.M., 2010. Moral judgments and visual attention: an eye-tracking investigation.
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